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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CERRITOS TRUCKING CO., a
California corporation, and
CERRITOS TRUCKING CO. ,
DONALD E. HEIMARK, JAMES B.
FLEMING, and WILLIAM L.
FARIESTER dba CERRITOS
ASSOCIATES, a partnership,
PlaintiffsRespondents,
VS.

UTAH VENTURE NO. 1,
WILLIAM J. LOWENBERG,
FERNE. LOWENBERG, and
UTAH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
INC., a Utah corporation,
DefendantsAppellants.

No. 17185

UTAH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
INC., a corporation and
WILLIAM J . LOWENBERG,
Cross PlaintiffsAppellants,
vs.

BETTILYON REALTY COMPANY,
a corporation, and EDMOND
0. DUNAHOO,
Cross DefendantsRespondents.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS
AND CROSS PLAINTIFFS - APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In this action plaintiffs-respondents sought specific
performance of an option to purchase real property and damages;
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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defendants-appellants sought, alternatively, rescission and
damages against plaintiffs and cross-defendants based upon
misrepresentation, mutual mistake and breach of fiduciary duty.

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN
THE LOWER COURT
Following a trial by jury, the district court granted
directed verdicts in favor of plaintiffs and cross-defendants, ana
against defendants, counterclairnants and cross-plaintiffs.
Defendants, counterclaimants and cross-plaintiffs appeal from
the granting of said directed verdicts and the subsequent entry
of findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Relief Sought on Appeal.
Defendants-respondents seek an order of this Court
reversing the granting of the directed verdicts in favor of
plaintiffs and cross-defendants and an order that a new trial
be granted in this action.

Defendants-respondents also seek

an order of this Court striking the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law filed by the district court in support
of its granting of a directed verdict.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE WITH
CITATIONS TO THE RECORD
A.

Parties.

Defendant William J. Lowenberg is a resident of
San Francisco who is engaged in the real estate business.
Defendants Utah Venture No. l and Utah Development Company,
Inc. are entities owned and controlled by Lowenberg.

-2-
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Each,

at various times, held legal title to the property at issue
in this action and are nominal parties to this action.
Plaintiff-respondent and counterclaim defendant
Cerritos Trucking Company is a California corporation and
the optionee of an option granted by Lowenberg on or about
April 28, 1978 (hereinafter "the Option").

Plaintiff-

respondent and counterclaim defendant Cerritos Associates
is a partnership comprised of plaintiffs-respondents
Cerritos Trucking Company, Donald E. Heimark, William L.
Fariester and James B. Fleming.
the assignee of the Option.

Cerritos Associates was

Messrs. Heimark, Fleming and

Fariester, also counterclaim defendants, were officers and
partners, respectively, of Cerritos Trucking Company and
Cerritos Associates.

Those three individuals are the

ultimate beneficiaries of the Option at issue herein.
(Hereinafter, Cerritos Trucking Company, Cerritos Associates,
Mr. Heimark, Mr. Fleming and Mr. Fariester are collectively
referred to as the "Cerritos Group".)
Cross-defendant Bettilyon Realty Company was the
intermediary between defendant Lowenberg on the one hand
and plaintiffs and cross-defendant Dunahoo on the other hand
with respect to negotiating of the lease and Option of the
property at issue.

One Gerald Daughtrey acted on behalf of

Bettilyon Realty Company in this respect.
Cross-defendant Edmond O. Dunahoo was the President

-3-
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of Fiber-Sciences, Inc., the sublessee on the property and
actual tenant of the property in question.

Fiber-Sciences,

Inc. was a wholly-owned subsidiary of EDO, a publicly held
corporation.

(Hereinafter, Mr. Dunahoo and the other officers

of Fiber Sciences, in their individual capacities, are
collectively referred to as "the Fiber Sciences Group".)
B.

Factual Background.

Lowenberg purchased a parcel of real property
located at the International Center near Salt Lake Airport
in 1977.

(Tr. of trial at p. 41, line 21-25; testimony of

William Lowenberg).

He then developed the property by hiring

a contractor to design and construct that warehouse as
designed.

(That parcel, as improved is hereafter referred

to as "the Property".)

By early 1978 the improvements on the

Property were nearing completion.

Lowenberg desired to find

a lease tenant or tenants to occupy the Property.

(Tr. p. 42,

lines 17-23; testimony of William Lowenberg).
Lowenberg contacted several realtors to assist him
in seeking a lease tenant or tenants.
Bettilyon Realty Company.

Among those was

(Tr. of trial at p. 43, lines 1-5;

testimony of William Lowenberg).

The person acting on behalf

of Bettilyon in this respect was Gerald Daughtrey.
During the period when Lowenberg was seeking a
lessee for the Property, Fiber-Sciences, a corporation engaged in manufacturing water and waste tank systems for
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aircrafts, had determined that it needed space in Salt Lake
City for a warehousing and manufacturing operation.
lines 8-14; testimony of Edmond Dunahoo).

(Tr. p. 137,

Its needs were for the

type of property Lowenberg had to offer.

Officers of Fiber-

Sciences had contacted Bettilyon Realty to assist in the search
for a suitable property.

Mr. Daughtrey, on behalf of Bettilyon

Realty, showed officers of Fiber-Sciences various properties,
including the Property owned by Mr. Lowenberg.

The officers

of Fiber Sciences determined that the Lowenberg Property was
best suited to Fiber-Sciences' needs.

(Tr. p. 140; testimony

of Edmond Dunahoo).
Fiber-Sciences was a wholly-owned corporation of
EDO, a publicly held corporation.

The officers of Fiber-

Sciences were informed by the parent EDO that Fiber-Sciences
should lease, not purchase, the property it required in Salt
Lake City.

(Tr. p. 138; testimony of Edmond Dunahoo).
However, Mr. Dunahoo and several of his vice

presidents, the Fiber Sciences Group, determined that they,
in their individual capacities, wished to purchase property
and in turn lease it to Fiber-Sciences.
testimony of Edmond Dunahoo).

(Tr. p. 144, lines 1-3;

The officers of Fiber-Sciences

determined that the purchase of Lowenberg's Property would be
a good investment for them and would provide a potential
retirement benefit that they did not at that time enjoy.
(Tr. p. 151; testimony of Edmond Dunahoo).
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Because of the desire of the officers of FiberSciences to own the Property, and notwithstanding that FiberSciences or EDO did not wish to own the Property, FiberSciences determined to purchase, not lease, the Property
from Lowenberg.

(Tr. p. 150, lines 18-20; testimony of

Edmond Dunahoo).

The only reason not to lease the Property

directly from Lowenberg was a desire of the Fiber-Sciences
officers to own or participate in the ownership of the
Property in their individual capacities.

(Tr. p. 168;

testimony of Edmond Dunahoo).
Mr. Heimark, President of Cerritos Trucking Company,
was a long-time friend of Mr. Dunahoo.

Mr. Heimark and Mr.

Dunahoo entered into an oral agreement that the Cerritos
Group and the Fiber-Sciences officers would share in the
ownership of the Property upon exercise of the Option.

(Tr.

p. 89, line 22; p. 94, lines 19-20; p. 96, line 9; testimony
of Donald Heimark; Tr. pp. 153-154; testimony of Edmond
Dunahoo; Tr. p. 128, lines 1-3; pp. 129-130; testimony of
Gerald Daughtrey) .
Subsequent to the "hand-shake" agreement between
the Cerritos Group and the Fiber-Sciences Group, Mr. Daughtrey
brought to Mr. Lowenberg a proposal that Fiber-Sciences would
lease the Property if an option to purchase the Property was
granted to the Fiber-Sciences Group.

Mr. Daughtrey told

Bill Lowenberg that the Fiber-Sciences Group would own or
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participate in the ownership of the Property.

(Tr. p. 127, lines

5-6; p. 128, lines 1-3; testimony of Gerald Daughtrey).

In fact,

the Option was negotiated by Mr. Daughtrey on the basis that the
Fiber-Sciences people would own or participate in the ownership
of the Property.

(Tr. pp. 129-130; testimony of Gerald Daughtrey).

There were no direct dealings between Lowenberg on the one hand
and either the Cerritos Group or the Fiber-Sciences Group on the
other hand.

All communications were transmitted through the

agency of Mr. Daughtrey.

(Tr. p. 165, lines 23-25; testimony

of Edmond Dunahoo).
Mr. Lowenberg was not told that Fiber-Sciences would
lease the building directly from him if there could be no
purchase option.
Daughtrey).

Mr. Lowenberg did not wish to sell the Property,

only to lease it.
Lowenberg).

(Tr. p. 205, lines 13-17; testimony of Gerald

(Tr. p. 42, lines 17-20; testimony of William

However, he was told that Fiber-Sciences would not

lease the Property unless the officers of Fiber-Sciences and/or
EDO could, in their individual capacities, be given the option
to buy the Property.

(Tr. at p. 46, lines 20-24).

It was Mr. Lowenberg's understanding that Cerritos
Trucking Company was to be the "vehicle" or nominee to hold
the Option but that the option was to be exercised by, and the
ownership of the Property ultimately was to vest in the officers
of Fiber-Sciences.
Lowenberg).

(Tr. p. 48, lines 9-13; testimony of William

Mr. Lowenberg was unwilling to grant an option to

purchase the Property to anyone other than the officers of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Fiber-Sciences.
Lowenberg).

(Tr. p. 48; lines 21-23; testimony of William

In fact, but for the representation that the

officers of Fiber-Sciences would own the Property, Mr. Lowenberg
would not have granted an option or sold the Property.

(Tr.

p. 218; testimony of William Lowenberg).
On or about April 28, 1978, Mr. Lowenberg executed
both a lease and an Option to Cerritos Trucking Company.

Mr.

Lowenberg understood that Cerritos was a "vehicle" or a nominee
and that the Option as drafted would be sufficient to cover

t~

"intent" of the parties that the officers of Fiber-Sciences woul:
own the building upon the exercise of the Option.
lines 19-22; testimony of William Lowenberg).

(Tr. p. 227,

These concessions

on Mr. Lowenberg's part were purely business oriented.
p. 217, lines 13-18; testimony of William Lowenberg).

(Tr.
The

concessions that Mr. Lowenberg made were first, that he would
grant an option to purchase the buidling, and second, he gave
an extremely favorable price for the building to the officers
of Fiber-Sciences.

(Tr. p. 49, lines 3-11; testimony of

William Lowenberg).
Sometime in late January or early February 1979,
Mr. Lowenberg heard rumors that the Fiber-Sciences Group would
not own the building upon the exercise of the Option.

Mr.

Lowenberg confronted Dunahoo with that information, and Dunahoo
admitted that Fiber-Sciences officers would not so own the
Property.

(Tr. p. 219, lines 2-14; testimony of William

-8-
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Lowenberg).

The officers of Fiber-Sciences had learned in

the surmner of 1978 that they would not participate in the
ownership but had no so informed Mr. Lowenberg.
testimony of Edmond Dunahoo).

(Tr. p. 157;

EDO or its counsel had deter-

mined that for Mr. Dunahoo and other officers of Fiber-Sciences
to own the building and lease it to Fiber-Sciences, Inc. would
be a conflict of interest requiring disclosure to EDO's shareholders.

Upon learning that the Fiber-Sciences Group would

not own the building, Mr. Lowenberg refused to honor the option
and tendered the $5,000.00 option price back to Cerritos
Trucking Company.
Subsequently, plaintiffs brought this action seeking
to enforce the Option and for damages.

The damages alleged

were the differential between the lease payments that had been
received by Lowenberg subsequent to notice of the exercise of the
Option and the amount of the mortgage payments during that period
that had been paid by Mr. Lowenberg.
Lowenberg denied his obligation to perform under the
Option and counterclaimed and cross-claimed for misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty and sought, additionally,
reformation of the contract.
Trial was had in this matter before a jury demanded
by defendant Lowenberg.
afternoon.

All parties rested on Thursday

Counsel for all parties spent several hours with

the court drafting and agreeing upon jury instructions on
Friday.

On Monday, the district court did not call back the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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jury to be charged and deliberate but instead granted the
directed verdict.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
A DIRECTED VERDICT.

At the close of evidence, plaintiffs' counsel made
a speaking motion for a directed verdict.

The grounds therefor

were stated by counsel for plaintiffs as follows:
(1)

There was no misrepresentation, no fraud

and no damages;
(2)

The record was void of material misrepre-

sentations;
(3)

(Tr. p. 293, lines 21 and 22)

There was no reliance on the part of
(Tr. p. 294, line 18)

Lowenberg;
(4)

(Tr. p. 292, lines 13-15)

There was no material mistake of fact;

(Tr. p. 296, lines 2-8)
(5)

The representations made to Mr. Lowenberg

were "bona fide expectations";

(Tr. p. 296, lines

9-10) and
(6)

The misrepresentations were in fact

"predictions of future events".

(Tr. p. 319,

lines 1-2).
After argument and a delay of nearly three days,
the court granted the motion, ruling and finding as follows:
(1)

"Defendant has failed by a preponderance

of the evidence";

(Tr. at p. 329, lines 8-13)
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(2)

There was no fraud or misrepresentation;

(Tr. p. 329, line 20)
(3)

Defendant did not rely upon representations

made; (Tr. p. 330, lines 3-4) and
(4)
acts.

The representations made were as to future

(Tr. p. 331, lines 6-7).

Defendants-appellants respectfully submit that the
district court erred in granting the directed verdict and in
so doing erred in applying the wrong legal standard to determine
whether a directed verdict should have been granted.
A.

The District Court Applied the Wrong Legal
Standard in Granting the Directed Verdict.

Pursuant to Rule 50 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, a motion for a directed verdict shall state the
specific grounds therefor.

As set forth, supra at p. 10,

plaintiffs based their motion on the grounds that defendants
had failed to produce evidence indicating a misrepresentation,
a mistake or damages, and additionally that any representations
made were as to a "future act" and therefore not misrepresentations but merely predictions.

None of plaintiffs' arguments

can withstand scrutiny.
In directing a verdict, the court must examine the
evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom
the directed verdict is attendant; it is not the province of
the court to weigh or determine the preponderance of the
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evidence.

Every controverted fact must be resolved in that

party's favor.

(Finlayson v. Brady, 121 Utah 204, 240 P. 2d 491

(1952); Boskovich v. Utah Constr. Co., 123 Utah 387, 259 P.2d
885 (1953)).

As this Court noted in Finlayson v. Brady, supra,

the Constitution, statutes and case authority establish the righ:
to a trial, and decision, by jury where there is evidence on
both sides.

(240 P.2d at 492).

If there was some substantial evidence in support of
the essential facts which a party is required to prove, or if
evidence or inferences deducible therefrom were of a character
which would cause reasonable men to arrive at different conclusions, a directed verdict may not be granted.

(Christensen v.

Utah Rapid Transit Co., 83 Utah 231, 27 P.2d 468, 471 (1933)).
In a recent decision of this Court reviewing and
reversing the granting of a judgment n.o.v., it was stated
as follows:
"When a party has so requested, he is
entitled to a trial by a jury of his fellow
citizens. In order that that right be
safeguarded as it should be, it is essential that the jury have the exclusive
prerogative of passing upon the credibility
of the evidence and of determining the facts.
Therefore, no matter how ardent may be
the trial judge's desire to see that justice
is done from his own point of view, he has
an obligation of judicial restraint: to
make allowance for the fact that other
reasonable minds might arrive at a different conclusion than his own.

-12-
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It has long been established in our law
that a court should not take the case from
the jury where there is any substantial dispute in the evidence on issues of fact but
can properly do so only when the matte~ is
so plain that there really is no conflict
in the evidence upon which reasonable minds
could differ."
Flvnn v. W. P. Harlin Constr. Co., 509 P.2d
356' 360-61

(1973).

The transcript unequivocably demonstrates that the
district court substituted its determination of the facts for
those that were or should have been those of the jury.

For

instance, the court stated:
"The Court further finds that the defendant
has failed in its burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence as to the count or counts
that the burden of proof is applicable, and has
failed in its burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence as to the count or counts that
the burden of proof is applicable."
(Tr. at p. 329, lines 8-13).
It is for the jury to determine whether the defendant has failed in its burden of proof by a preponderance of
the evidence, not the court.

(Finlayson v. Brady, supra).

It was improper for the district court to weigh the
evidence and determine where the preponderancy lay.
inquiry is the exclusive province of the jury.

That

The district

court may well have determined, after three days in which to
consider testimony and in light of the jury instructions that
counsel for all parties and the court were considering, that
the preponderance of the evidence was with plaintiff.
theless,

None-

his substituting of his judgment for that of the

jury was clear and prejudicial error.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13-

The arguments of plaintiffs' counsel in support of
their motions for a directed verdict invited the district comt
to make such substitutions.

No legal authority was presented

to support the proposition that the evidence presented by
defendants was legally insufficient.

Instead, the thrust of

their argument was conclusory statements in which a weighing
of the evidence was implicit.

As will be pointed out more

fully, infra, there was sufficient evidence presented by
defendants from which the jury could have determined that
Lowenberg placed reasonable reliance upon material representations made to him and was damaged thereby.

It was error for

the district court to arrogate to itself the weighing of that
evidence in this case.
Other "findings" of the district court were similarly
conclusory and reflected an implicit weighing of the evidence.
For instance, the court further ruled and found:
"that, number one, that there has been
no fraud or misrepresentation."
(Tr. p. 329, lines 19-20).
The question of whether or not there was a misrepre·
sentation is, under Utah law, a determination for the jury.
(Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P. 2d 798 (1980)).
The court did not find that there was no evidence supporting
defendants' contentions that misrepresentations had been made,
but, obviously, weighed the evidence and concluded that there
had been "no misrepresentation".

-14-
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As a matter of fact, the evidence was quite to the
contrary; there had been a clear misrepresentation made to
Mr. Lowenberg.

That misrepresentation was that if he would

grant an option, that option would be for the benefit of and
exercised by the officers of Fiber-Sciences.

All parties

testified that an agreement had been entered into between the
Cerritos Group and the Fiber-Sciences Group to that effect.
Mr. Daughtrey testified that he negotiated the lease and
Option between Cerritos and Mr. Lowenberg "on that basis"
and Mr. Lowenberg testified that he would not have granted
an option but for that representation.

Similarly, there is no

question but that representation proved untrue and that the
Fiber-Sciences Group did not participate in or benefit from
the ownership of the Property upon the exercise of the Option.
Thus, there can be no question but that evidence was adduced
supporting defendants' contention that a representation was
made to Mr. Lowenberg that proved false.

Therefore, the ques-

tion for the jury was properly whether or not plaintiffs and
cross-defendants acted negligently in causing that representation to be made to Mr. Lowenberg by Mr. Daughtrey and in
negotiating the Option on that understanding.

It is abundantly

clear, based upon the record, that there was substantial evidence
presented to the jury from which they could have concluded that
there had been a negligent misrepresentation made to Mr. Lowenberg
on behalf of plaintiffs and cross-defendants.

Defendants,
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therefore, submit that it was clear error for the court to
substitute its decision for that of the jury and that said
error is prejudicial and sufficient to cause a reversal and
the granting of a new trial.
Under Utah law, in a misrepresentation case the
issues of (1) whether a misrepresentation was made; (2)
whether there was fraud or negligence by the person making
the misrepresentation; (3) the materiality of any misrepresentations; and (5) whether any damage resulted therefrom,
are all questions for the jury and must be submitted to the
jury if there is conflicing evidence.

(Flynn v. W. P. Harlin

Constr. Co., supra; Finlayson v. Brady, supra).

The court

should not have taken those issues from the jury in this case.
POINT II. DEFENDANTS PRESENTED EVIDENCE FROM
WHICH THE JURY COULD HAVE FOUND IN
FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS ON THEIR CLAIM
BASED UPON NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION.
The tort of negligent misrepresentation has long
been recognized in the State of Utah.

(Jardine v. Brunswick

Corp., 18 Utah 2d 378, 423 P.2d 659 (1967); Ellis v. Hale,
13 Utah 2d 279, 373 P.2d 382 (1962)).

In Jardine, the court

stated as follows:
"Where one having a pecuniary interest
in a transaction, is in a superior position
to know material facts, and carelessly or
negligently makes a false representation
concerning them, expecting the other party
to rely and act thereon, and the other
party reasonably does so and suffers loss
in that transaction, the representor can be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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held responsible if the other elements of
fraud are also present."
(423 P.2d at 662).
Jardine v. Brunswick has been cited with approval by
this Court recently in Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos,
607 P.2d 798 (1980) and Dugan v. Jones, No. 16334, filed July 23,
1980).

In the Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives case, this Court

refused to reverse a jury verdict for defendants.

The plaintiff

bank had brought actions against the defendants for collection
of promissory notes.

Each defendant had alleged as a defense

that the plaintiff had fraudulently induced them to execute the
notes.

In refusing to overturn the jury verdict, this Court

stated as follows:
"Although the evidence was conflicting in
many respects, there was substantial
evidence upon which the jury could find
all the elements of fraud."
(607 P.2d at 800).
"The issue of actual reliance and the
reasonableness of reliance is, of course,
for the jury to determine.

The fact is there is ample evidence in the
record from which the jury could find that
representation to have indeed been made."
(607 P.2d at 801).
"Under the circumstances of this case, it
was clearly, as the trial court properly
ruled, within the province of the jury to
determine whether defendants' reliance on
the repeated assertions of plaintiff was
justified."
(607 P.2d at 802).

-17Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In Dugan v. Jones, supra, this Court reversed the
district court's denial of a trial by jury of defendants'
counterclai~s

and cross-claims alleging fraud, negligent

misrepresen ation, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary
duty.

This

~ourt

held that despite the fact that plaintiff

asserted onl; equitable claims, defendant was entitled to
a trial by jury on his legal counterclaims and cross-claims.
That case was remanded for a jury trial.
Defendants in this action presented evidence on
all elements of negligent misrepresentation from which the
jury could have found in their favor.

In this circumstance,

it is appropriate that this Court remand for a new trial.
(Dugan v. Jones, supra).
A.

A Misrepresentation Was Made to Lowenberg
By or On Behalf of Plaintiffs and CrossDefendants.

Defendants submit that there is no question but that
the unqualified and unconditional representation was made to
Lowenberg that the Option to purchase was for the benefit of
the officers of Fiber-Sciences and that those individuals would
own or participate in the ownership of the Property upon its
exercise.

The only dispute in the testimony is whether

Lowenberg was told that the ownership would exclusively be
for the benefit of the Fiber-Sciences Group or whether they
would "participate" in the ownership of the Property.

-18-
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(Compare testimony of William Lowenberg at Tr. p. 48, lines
18-20 with that of Gerald Daughtrey at Tr. p. 127, lines 5-6).
Even the district court appears to have acknowledged the making
of that representation.

(Tr. p. 321, remarks of district court).

It is inconceivable that the district court could have
determined that there was an absence of evidence that could
support a jury determination that such a representation was
made.

Similarly, there was no doubt that that representation

proved untrue.

Mr. Dunahoo stated unequivocably that he and

his group would not participate in the ownership of the building.
(Tr. p. 159, line 22; p. 160, line 10; testimony of Edmond Dunahoo).
Defendants submit that there is no question but that a representation was made to Lowenberg that proved untrue.
B.

The Representation Was to a Presently Existing
Fact.

Counsel for plaintiffs advance the argument in support
of their directed verdict that the representation made to Mr.
Lowenberg that the option would be for the benefit of the FiberSciences Group and that they would participate in the ownership
of the Property was not actionable because it concerned a future
event.

Their argument appears to be that because the Option

could not be exercised until some future date, any representation
as to the effect of the exercise of that Option was necessarily
an opinion or prediction as to a future event.

The inverse of

that argument presumably is that there was no misrepresentation
as to a presently existing fact.
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Their argument misses the crucial point.

The repre-

sentation made to Mr. Lowenberg was that the Option was for
the benefit of the Fiber-Sciences Group.

The unconditional and

unqualified representation was not that if events in the future
proved propitious the Fiber-Sciences Group might receive some
remote benefit from the grant of the Option, but that it was
presently intended and agreed upon that the Option would be for
the benefit of the Fiber-Sciences Group and that they would
participate, upon the exercise of the Option, in the ownership
of the Property.
That was a respresentation as to a present state of
mind, intention and agreement.

The fact that the Option could

only be exercised in the future does not detract from the fact
that the representation made was as to a presently existing
fact--viz., the agreement and intent of the Fiber-Sciences
Group and the Cerritos Group.
An argument similar to that advanced by plaintiffs in
this action was advanced by plaintiffs in Berkeley Bank for
Cooperatives, supra.

In that case, plaintiffs argued that fraud

or misrepresentation could not be predicated upon representations
or statements of an intention to perform or not perform an act
in the future.

In that case, the representation was that the

promissory notes would not be collected.

This Court readily

disposed of that argument as follows:
"Plaintiff also grounds its appeal on
the principle that fraud cannot be predicated
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-upon representations or statements of an
~ntention to perform or not perform an act
in the future. However, what is involved
in this case is whether the fact of the then
present intent of the bank a"ttlie time of its
representations to the farmers was contrary
to the statements made to the farmers. Under
such circumstances, the misrepresentations are
actionable. As stated in Harper and James,
The Law of Torts, Vol. 1, 571-72 (1956):
A closely similar problem is raised
by a promise or statement of future
conduct by one who, at the time, intends
not to fulfill the promise. The promise
itself is regarded as a representation
of a present intention to perform.
Hence, such a promise, made by one
not intending to perf orrn operates as
a misrepresentation--a misrepresentation
of the speaker's state of mind, at the
time, and is actionable as a misrepresentation of 'fact.'"
607 P.2d at 804.
In this action, then, the misrepresentation was as
to the agreement and intention of the Cerritos Group and the
Fiber-Sciences Group at the time of the granting of the Option.
That was a presently existing fact and was a negligently made
representation that proved false.
C.

The Representations Made to Lowenberg Were
Material.

Mr. Lowenberg testified that but for the fact that
the Fiber-Sciences Group was to own the Property, he would not
have granted an option to purchase the Property.
lines 3-5).

(Tr. p. 218,

That testimony is moreover entirely consistent

with prior actions of Mr. Lowenberg.

For instance, he stated

that he did not wish to sell the Property but wished to lease

-21-
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it.

(Tr. p. 42, lines 17-20; testimony of William Lowenberg).
Moreover, Mr. Lowenberg had previously been unwilling

to sell the Property.

It was only after he was told that the

Option would be for the benefit of the Fiber-Sciences Group and
that they required it that he agreed to grant an Option for the
purchase of the Property.

Mr. Daughtrey further testified that

the lease and Option was "negotiated on the basis" that the Fiber·
Sciences Group would participate.

(Tr. pp. 129-130; testimony~,

Gerald Daughtrey) .
Thus, from the fact that the Option was negotiated on
the basis that the Fiber-Sciences Group would participate, it
may be inferred that the Fiber-Sciences Group and the Cerritos
Group understood the materiality and importance of that factor.
The obvious inference to be drawn from all the testimony is that
the Fiber-Sciences Group would own or participate in the ownership of the Property was a material fact and was the basis for
negotiation of the Option.
Certainly, it must be concluded that the jury could
have inferred from the testimony presented to them that that
fact was "material".

Under the law applicable in this juris-

diction, the question of materiality is clearly one for the jury.
(Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, supra; Dugan v. Jones,
supra).

Therefore, it was error for the district court not to

allow the jury to determine the materiality of the representation.
D.

Lowenberg Reasonably Relied Upon the Representat~

-22-
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'

Made to Hirn.
Evidence was presented at trial from which the jury
could have determined that Lowenberg relied upon the representation made to him that the Fiber-Sciences Group would own or
participate in the ownership of the Property upon the exercise
of the Option.
~

that point.

Lowenberg's own testimony was unequivocable on

He stated in no uncertain terms that but for the

fact that the Fiber-Sciences people were to own the Property,
he would not have granted the Option.

(Tr. p. 218, lines 3-5).

This is, of course, consistent with his earlier course of action
in refusing to grant an option to purchase, or to sell the
Property, prior to being informed that the Fiber-Sciences Group
would own or participate in the ownership of the Property.
It is often the case that evidence of reliance must
be primarily proved by the testimony of the party claiming
reliance.

That was indeed the case in Berkeley Bank for

Cooperatives, supra:
"The defendants stated they would have
continued to refuse to sign the notes
if they had not been repeatedly assured
that the notes were required as a standard
procedure of all coops getting loans from
plaintiff, that they were solely for the
purpose of assuring Dairymen with a source
of milk, and that they would not be collected."
607 P. 2d at 801.
Again, there were facts presented from which the jury

m.

could have concluded that Lowenberg acted in reliance upon the

~

representations made.

The factual issue of reliance was one
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invested in the province of the jury, and it was error for the
district court to itself weigh the evidence and conclude that
Mr. Lowenberg had not relied.
The court based its conclusion in part upon the notion
that the Option was expressly "assignable".

From this the

district court concluded that Lowenberg could not have relied
upon the representation that the Option would be for the benefit
of the Fiber-Sciences Group.

In doing so, the court was obvious::
1

weighing the facts and coming to its own conclusion.
sufficient in itself to demonstrate error.

This is

In addition, the

conclusion of the district court was not logical.

For instance, ,

Mr. Heimark testified that an assignee would be necessary upon
the exercise of the Option in order to take advantage of the
tax provisions.

(Tr. p. 76, line 20; testimony of Heimark).

Lowenberg testified that he understood that Cerritos Trucking
Company was only to be a "vehicle" or nominee.

(Tr. p. 48;

testimony of William Lowenberg).
Logically, the fact that the Option was made expresslv
assignable is supportive of Mr. Lowenberg's position.

If the

Option had not been expressly assignable, it could have been
argued that Lowenberg should have been put on notice that
Cerritos Trucking Company, and not the Fiber-Sciences Group,
would of necessity exercise the Option.

The fact that the Option;

was assignable meant that the Fiber-Sciences Group could be the !
assignee of the Option and subsequently exercise that Option.
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I

n

-Thus, the fact that the Option was made expressly assignable
is consistent with Mr. Lowenberg's understanding that Cerritos
Trucking Company was a vehicle or nominee and that the Option
would be exercised by the Fiber-Sciences Group at the appropriate time.
Again, there is nothing unreasonable about such a
course of action of Mr. Lowenberg.

Certainly, the jury could

have concluded or could have logically inferred from the evidence
presented to them that Mr. Lowenberg reasonably relied upon the
representations made to him that the Option would be for the
benefit of the Fiber-Sciences Group.
E.

Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants Were Negligent
in Representing to Lowenberg that the FiberSciences Group Would Own or Participate in the
Ownership of the Property.

Prior to requesting Lowenberg to grant an option that
would be for the benefit of the Fiber-Sciences Group, the
Cerritos Group and Fiber-Sciences Group had entered into an
agreement whereby Fiber-Sciences Group would participate in
the ownership of the Property.
Donald Heimark).

(Tr. pp. 95-96; testimony of

At that time, Mr. Heimark made no investiga-

tion, nor indeed was he aware, that a potential conflict of
1

interest existed with respect to the officers of Fiber-Sciences

I

I

owning a building and leasing that building to the corporation
they represented.

(Tr. pp. 91-92; testimony of Donald Heimark).
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Mr. Dunahoo testified that he believed his participatio:
in the ownership of the building and that of his associates was
not improper.
Dunahoo).

(Tr. p. 144, lines 1-3; testimony of Edmond

Later Mr. Dunahoo was informed that he and his asso-

ciates could not participate in the ownership of the building
by counsel to EDO, the parent of Fiber-Sciences.
Lowenberg had the right to rely upon the representation;

I

made to him that the Fiber-Sciences Group would have the ability
to own the Property.

Correspondingly, there was a duty on the

part of the Fiber-Sciences Group and Cerritos Group to determine
whether the Fiber-Sciences Group could participate in the ownershi:,
of the building.
In Dugan v. Jones, supra, this Court set forth the
standard of care and competence required of one making material
representations in connection with the purchase or sale of real
property.
"Jardine cites the Restatement, Torts,
Sec. 552. The current standards of the
evolving tort of negligent misrepresentation
are set forth in Restatement, Torts, 2nd,
Sec. 552:
'(l) One who, in the course of his
business, profession or employment, or
in any other transaction in which he has
a pecuniary interest supplies false information for the guidance of others in
their business transactions, is subject
to liability for pecuniary loss caused
to them by their justifiable reliance
upon the information, if he fails to
exercise reasonable care or competence
in obtaining or cotmnunicating the information.'
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'(2) Except as stated in Subsection
(3), the liability in Subsection (1) is
limited to loss suffered.
(a) by the person or one of
a limited group of persons for whose
benefit and guidance he intends to
supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it
in a transaction that he intends the
information to influence or knows
that the recipient so intends or in
a substantially similar transaction.'
Under comment e of Sec. 552 (p. 130), it
is stated:
'Since the rule of liability stated
in Subsection (1) is based upon negligence,
the defendant is subject to liability if,
but only if, he has failed to exercise the
care of competence of a reasonable man in
obtaining or communicating the information ....
'The particulars in which the recipient
of information supplied by another is entitled
to expect the exercise of care and competence
depend upon the character of the information
that is supplied. When the information concerns a fact not known to the recipient, he
is entitled to expect that the supplier will
exercise that care and competence in its
ascertainment which the supplier's business
or profession requires and which, therefore,
the supplier professes to have by engaging
in it. Thus the recipient is entitled to
expect that such investigations as are necessary will be carefully made and that his
informant will have normal business or professional competence to form an intelligent
judgment upon the data obtained .... "
The actions of the Cerritos Group and the FiberSciences Group fall far short of the required level of care or
competence.

They had the power prior to making the representation
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to determine whether or not a conflict of interest existed.
They could have received an opinion of counsel or a firm
approval from their parent corporation.

They did neither.

Rather, they were content to assume that such conflicts of
interest as may have existed were not disabling.

Having not

done so, they were clearly negligent in making the unqualified
and unconditional representation that the Fiber-Sciences Group
would own or participate in the ownership of the Property
to Lowenberg.
Certainly, that fact was one peculiarly within the
knowledge of the Fiber-Sciences Group.

Mr. Lowenberg was not

privy to the internal guidelines of EDO and Fiber-Sciences
respecting conflicts of interest.

Moreover, no one even

alluded to the potential problem of a conflict of interest.
The representations made to Mr. Lowenberg were unconditional
and unqualified.

Plaintiffs and cross-defendants were clearly

negligent in not exercising care and competence to determine
the ability of the Fiber-Sciences Group to participate in the
ownership of the Property prior to making representations to
Mr. Lowenberg.
Again, the question of whether or not the representa·
tions were negligently made was one for the jury.

Evidence was

presented upon which the jury could have determined that plain·
tiffs and cross-defendants acted negligently.

In this situatioo,

it was error for the district court to grant a directed verdict,
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taking this issue from the jury.
F.

There Was Evidence of Damage to Defendants as a
Result of the Misrepresentations Made By Plaintiffs
and Cross-Defendants.

Mr. Lowenberg testified that among the concessions he
maje to the Fiber-Sciences Group was the favorable price to be
paid for the Property by the Fiber-Sciences Group upon the
exercise of the Option.

(Tr. p. 49; testimony of William

Lowenberg) .
At trial there was ample testimony to support Mr.
Lowenberg's claim that the Property was worth more at the time
the Option was granted than the option price for the Property.
Dale Jackman, an MAI appraiser, testified as to the methods he
usej in appraising the value of the Property as of April 28,
1978, the time of the granting of the Option.
232; testimony of Dale Jackman).

(Tr. at pp. 231-

He then testified that in his

opinion the Property at the time the Option was granted was
worth $1,750,000.00.

(Tr. at p. 237; testimony of Dale Jackman).

That was some $200,000.00 in excess of the option price set
for the Property at or about that time.

In addition, Exhibit D-L2

was received into evidence, which exhibit stated Mr. Jackman's
opinion as to the value of the Property on or about April 28,
1978.

That exhibit similarly sets a value for the Property at

that time of $1,750,000.00, or $200,000.00 more than the option
price.
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In rebuttal to Mr. Jackman, plaintiffs offer the
testimony of Larry Rigby, who is not an MAI approved appraiser,
and, presumably, whose testimony on that basis might have been
less credible in the eyes of a jury.

plaint~

Even Mr. Rigby,

expert, testified that the Property at the time of the Option
had a value of from $1,600,000.00 to $1,645,000.00.
testimony of Larry Rigby).

(Tr. p. 26J.,

Thus, plaintiffs' expert also testi·

i

fied that the Property was worth from $50,000.00 to $95,000.00
more at the time of the granting of the Option than the option
price stated.
Similarly, Mr. Daughtrey had prepared for plaintiffs,
and had provided to Mr. Heimark, several projections of the
value of the Property.

The range of values for the Property

in Mr. Daughtrey's projections was from $1,600,000.00 to
$1,890,000.00.

Thus, Mr. Heimark was presented with informa-

tion that the Property was worth from $50,000.00 to $340,000.00
more than the option price.
The foregoing demonstrates that ample evidence as to
damages was presented to the jury from which the jury could have
concluded that Mr. Lowenberg suffered damages owing to his grant·
ing of the Option to purchase the Property.
G.

Defendants Offered Testimony as to All of the
Elements of Negligent Misrepresentation.

As set forth in Dugan v. Jones, supra:
"The elements of an action in deceit
based on fraudulent misrepresentation are:
I
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(1) a representation; (2) concerning a
presently existing material fact; (3) which
was false; (4) which the representor either
(a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly,
knowing that he had insufficient knowledge
upon which to base such representation; (5)
for the purpose of inducing the other party
to act upon it; (6) that the other party,
acting reasonably and in ignorance of its
falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8)
and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his
injury and damage."

i

As it has been noted, in an action based upon negligent misrepresentation, item (4) above requires only the lack
of due care and competence on the part of the actor, and not
fraud or recklessness.
Defendants submit that the evidence at trial was
sufficient from which a jury could find:
(1) Plaintiffs and cross-defendants represented
to Mr. Lowenberg that the Option would be for the
benefit of the Fiber-Sciences Group and they would
either own or participate in the ownership of the
Property;
(2) That agreement and intention was an existing
material fact;
(3) That fact proved false;
(4) Plaintiffs and cross-defendants made such
representation negligently;
(5) That representation was made to induce Mr.
Lowenberg to grant the Option;
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(6) Mr. Lowenberg acted reasonably and in
ignorance of its falsity;
(7) Mr. Lowenberg did in fact rely upon that
representation;
(8) Mr. Lowenberg was induced to act by that
representation; and

(9) Mr. Lowenberg was damaged thereby.
Defendants submit that the evidence set forth, supra,
was sufficient to demonstrate that a jury could have found
that all elements were satisfied.

In this situation, it was

error on the part of the district court to grant directed verdicts.
POINT Ill.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING AND
SIGNING FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW SUBSEQUENT TO RULING ON THE MOTION
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.

This Court has previously ruled in Smith v. Thornton,
23 Utah 2d 110, 458 P.2d 870 that on a motion for a directed
verdict the trial court need not enter findings and conclusions
in granting the motion.

That ruling was consistent with the

language of Rule 52(a) which sets forth those instances in
which the district courts are to find facts and state conclusions of law.

Rule 52(a) excludes motions under Rule 50.

Not only should a trial court not be required to
state findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is inconsistent
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--with the edicts of Rule SO(a) and the right to a trial by jury
for a court to do so.

Pursuant to Rule SO(a), a motion for a

directed verdict "shall state the specific grounds therefor".
It is thus clear that the moving party has the burden of stating
with specificity the grounds, factual and legal, upon which a
motion for a directed verdict is based.

That in turn suggests

that it is inappropriate for findings and conclusions to be
subsequently entered that could bolster and enlarge upon the
specific grounds upon which the motion rested.
As a practical matter, findings of fact and conclusions
of law are typically drafted by the successful party.

In fact,

in this action, the district court invited counsel for plaintiffs
to draft findings of fact and conclusions of law.
332).

(Tr. pp. 331-

Plaintiffs' counsel did so, and the district court signed

those findings and conclusions over the objection of counsel for
defendants.

In that situation, the findings and conclusions

are not drafted in the light most
losing party.

fa\~rable

to the opposing and

Rather, they are drafted, as is customarily the

case, to support the decision of the court in granting the motion.
Because upon review of a motion for directed verdict
this Court is required to view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party against whom the directed verdict was
granted, subsequent findings of fact and conclusions of law
must be disregarded.
In O'Brien v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 293 F.2d 1
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(3rd Cir. 1960), motions were granted in a jury trial at the
close of plaintiff's case both pursuant to Rule 4l(b) and
pursuant to Rule 50.

In that case, plaintiff on appeal

challenged the filing of findings of fact and conclusions
of law.

The Third Circuit, with respect to its review of

the motion for a directed verdict pursuant to Rule 50,
ignored the findings of fact and conclusions of law, stating
as follows:
"If the court grants it no findings of
fact are necessary and upon review the
evidence must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the party against
whom the motion is made. Hence in this
case it is held that no findings of fact
were necessary, any indication in
Makowsky v. Pavlick, supra, to the contrary notwithstanding."
293 F.2d at 9.
In order for this Court to review the record in the
light most favorable to defendants, as it must, it must ignore
the findings of fact and conclusions of law filed subsequently
by the court as drafted by counsel for plaintiffs.

Defendants

respectfully submit that this Court should strike the findings
of fact and conclusions of law on the basis that not only are
such findings and conclusions not required pursuant to Rule 50,
but that they may not be filed by the court in support of the
granting of a motion for a directed verdict.

Any other rule

is an open invitation for the district court to sift and weigh
evidence in the same fashion that it would in a non-jury trial.
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POINT IV.

THERE WAS EVIDENCE PRESENTED FROM WHICH
THE JURY COULD HAVE CONCLUDED THAT
PLAINTIFFS AND CROSS-DEFENDANTS BREACHED
FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS OWED TO DEFENDANTS.

A.

Evidence Was Presented From Which the Jury
Could Have Determined that Plaintiffs and
Cross-Defendant Dunahoo Breached Fiduciary
Duties Owing to Lowenberg.

Under Utah law the issue of whether a fiduciary duty
exists and has been breached is a question of fact to be determined by the jury.

(Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (1978);

Mccutcheon v. Brownfield, 2 Wash. App. 348, 467 P.2d 868, 874
(1970)).

In so doing, all pertinent facts and circumstances

must be considered.
In this action, plaintiffs and Mr. Lowenberg had
more than the usual purchaser-seller relationship.

Mr.

Lowenberg was induced to grant the Option as a result of
representations made that it would be for the benefit of,
and indeed a personal benefit for, the Fiber-Sciences Group.
Mr. Lowenberg was asked to grant a personal benefit to the
Fiber-Sciences Group in a transaction that properly only
concerned Fiber-Sciences, Inc. and Mr. Lowenberg.
Because of the fact that the Fiber-Sciences Group,
through the agency of Mr. Daughtrey, requested a personal and
unusual benefit from Mr. Lowenberg, the jury could have easily
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inferred that a fiduciary relationship existed, at least to
the extent of requiring the Fiber-Sciences Group and plaintiffs
to ensure that the representation that the Fiber-Sciences Group
would own or participate in the owenrship of the Property was
fulfilled.

The making of a request for a special personal

benefit and the representations made to Mr. Lowenberg are
certainly sufficient so that the jury could have determined
that a relationship of trust and confidence existed between
plaintiffs and the Fiber-Sciences Group on the one hand and
Mr. Lowenberg on the other hand.
Certainly, this issue was not addressed by the moving
parties in their motion for a directed verdict or by the court
in its response thereto.

This issue was simply by-passed or

perhaps assumed away, sub silentio.
Defendants submit that there was ample evidence presented from which a jury could have determined that a relationship of trust and confidence existed between Mr. Lowenberg on
the one hand and plaintiffs and cross-defendant Dunahoo on the
other hand and that said relationship of trust and confidence
had been breached by the failure of the representations made
to Mr. Lowenberg to be fulfilled and, further, by the absence
of timely notice to Mr. Lowenberg when it was determined that
the Fiber-Sciences Group could not participate in the ownership
of the Property.
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B.

Evidence Was Adduced From Which the Jury Could
Have Determined that the Cross-Defendant
Bettilyon Breached a Duty of Trust and Confidence.

Cross-defendant Bettilyon Realty Company, by and
through its agent and employee, Gerald Daughtrey, had undertaken
to find a tenant for Mr. Lowenberg.

Subsequently, Mr. Daughtrey

registered with Mr. Lowenberg Fiber-Sciences, Inc.

That meant

that should Fiber-Sciences, Inc. lease or purchase the Property,
Bettilyon Realty Company would be entitled to a commission.

In

fact, a commission of $70,000.00 was paid to Bettilyon Realty
by Mr. Lowenberg.
In this situation, a duty of trust and loyalty exists
between the owner of property and a licensed real estate agency
that undertakes to lease or sell it, or present offers to that
effect, for or to the owner.
Unfortunately, Mr. Daughtrey was, in fact, representing both sides in this transaction.

He had undertaken to locate

for Fiber-Sciences, Inc. a property suitable for its needs.

In

so doing, he was acting as agent for and on behalf of FiberSciences, Inc.
The practicality of the matter from Bettilyon's and
Mr. Daughtrey's standpoint was that if an arrangement could be
negotiated whereby Fiber-Sciences, Inc. would lease or purchase
the Property from Mr. Lowenberg, then he would be ensured of a
commission.

If Fiber-Sciences did not lease or purchase the
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Property from Mr. Lowenberg, but some other entity so did,
Bettilyon and Mr. Daughtrey would not. get a commission.
In this situation, it is quite clear that Mr.
Daughtrey bent his efforts towards achieving what the FiberSciences officers and Mr. Heimark and his associates wished
in derrogation of his duty to arrange or negotiate an optimal
situation for Mr. Lowenberg.
Mr. Daughtrey testified that although he attended
meetings with Mr. Dunahoo and Mr. Heimark and others, at which
the needs of Fiber-Sciences were discussed, he did not report
to Mr. Lowenberg what transpired at those meetings.

Further,

it is abundantly evident that Mr. Daughtrey did not attempt
to negotiate a lease of the Property from Fiber-Sciences as
Mr. Lowenberg had desired, even though Mr. Daughtrey presumably
knew that Fiber-Sciences would agree to lease the Property.
Instead, he directed his efforts to•Jards arranging a purchase
of the Property, consistent with the wishes of Mr. Dunahoo and
Mr. Heimark, but inconsistent with the wishes of Mr. Lowenberg.
From the above, the jury could well have determined
that Bettilyon Realty, through Gerald Daughtrey, breached its
obligation of trust and confidence owed to Lowenberg in that
it did not attempt to arrange a lease as Mr. Lowenberg desired
and did not fully report to Mr. Lowenberg all the information
Mr. Daughtrey had as to Fiber-Sciences' needs and wishes.
this Court stated in Dugan v. Jones, supra:
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As

"Though not occupying a fiduciary relationship with prospective purchasers, a real estate
agent hired by the vendor is expected to be
honest, ethical and competent and is answerable
at law for breaches of his or her statutory
duty to the public."
The real estate agent owes an even greater duty to the
seller of the property whom he represents.
and fully represent Lowenberg.

He did not fairly

Rather, he failed to inform

Lowenberg that Fiber-Sciences, Inc. would lease the Property
whether or not a purchase option was granted to its officers.
This was a clear breach of his duty to Mr. Lowenberg.

Caught

in a situation of conflict, Mr. Daughtrey chose to represent
the interests of Mr. Heimark and Mr. Dunahoo in derrogation
to his duty to Mr. Lowenberg.
CONCLUSION
Defendants submit that the foregoing demonstrates
conclusively that the district court erred in not allowing the
jury to determine matters entrusted to them pursuant to the
laws of the State of Utah.

Defendants clearly met their

burden of presenting evidence from which the jury could have,
and probably would have, ruled in favor of defendants and
against plaintiffs and cross-defendants.

In this situation,

the proper remedy is for this Court to remand for a new trial
in order that defendants be given their right to a trial by
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jury as provided by the Constitution, statutes and decisional
law of the State of Utah.
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of January,
1981.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL &. McCARTHY
Robert A. Peterson
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